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ABSTRACT
Machine learning is widely used in security research to classify
malicious activity, ranging frommalware tomalicious URLs and net-
work traffic. However, published performance numbers often seem
to leave little room for improvement and, due to a wide range of
datasets and configurations, cannot be used to directly compare al-
ternative approaches; moreover, most evaluations have been found
to suffer from experimental bias which positively inflates results.
In this manuscript we discuss the implementation of Tesseract, an
open-source tool to evaluate the performance of machine learning
classifiers in a security setting mimicking a deployment with typical
data feeds over an extended period of time. In particular, Tesseract
allows for a fair comparison of different classifiers in a realistic
scenario, without disadvantaging any given classifier. Tesseract
is available as open-source to provide the academic community
with a way to report sound and comparable performance results,
but also to help practitioners decide which system to deploy under
specific budget constraints.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Machine learning (ML) is now a widespread approach in security lit-
erature to tackle malware detection: from more traditional malware
such as Android, Windows, and PDF, to other malicious activities
such as botnet traffic, DGA domains, malicious URLs and harm-
ful Javascript. Given high performance with F1 of up to 95-99%,
achieved especially on Windows [6, 10] and Android [3, 9, 15]
platforms, it may seem that using machine learning for malware
detection is a solved problem. However, recent studies [1, 11, 12]
have shown that most evaluations suffer from experimental bias
that positively inflates results. Although security researchers bor-
rowed best practices from the machine learning community, these
may not be appropriate for a security setting. For example, k-fold
cross validation highly inflates results in a malware context, because
it integrates future knowledge about not-yet-seen malware into
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training [1, 11, 12]; when the training set is chosen with objects
that are temporally precedent to the testing objects, the classifier
performance degrades significantly due to concept drift [8]. In a
recent study [12], we have identified and systematized sources of
experimental bias that affect even recent top-tier papers (e.g., [3],
[9]): temporal bias (caused by violating temporal consistency of
train and test objects) and spatial bias (caused by using unrealistic
ratios of malware-to-goodware in the test set).
In this manuscript, we discuss the implementation of Tesser-
act [12], an open-source tool that we have made available to the
community to ensure fair, sound and comparable evaluations of
machine learning classifiers. The theoretical findings on which
Tesseract is based are described in [12]. Tesseract supports any
Scikit-learn and Keras classifier and feature space, and outputs
plots and metrics that consider performance decay over time due
to concept drift. This manuscript illustrates how to properly use
Tesseract, and clarifies how we engineered it to obtain a simple,
flexible tool that could be easily reused by other researchers.
We remark that we use (experimental) bias to refer to the details
of an experimental setting that depart from the conditions in a
real-world deployment and can have a positive impact (bias) on per-
formance. We do not intend it to relate to the classifier bias/variance
trade-off [5] from traditional machine learning terminology.
We encourage the adoption of Tesseract [12] as a way to per-
form fair, unbiased, and comparable experiments of ML classifiers
in security contexts to promote their evaluation in realistic settings.
2 BACKGROUND
Researchers have started to focus on understanding how to achieve
fair ML evaluations both in the security community [1, 11–13, 17]
and in the ML community [7, 16]. The first experimental bias found
in security is probably associated with the base-rate fallacy in in-
trusion detection [4]: in the presence of highly imbalanced datasets
(e.g., most traffic is benign) ROC curves, TPR and FPR have been
misleading metrics to evaluate system performance; this is because,
for an FPR of 0.1%, there may still be millions of false positives
with only thousands of true positives. Moreover, in imbalanced
datasets Accuracy is also a very misleading metric, which is dis-
couraged to report alone [7]. Some studies [13, 17] discuss incorrect
experimental setups and challenges in fair security evaluations,
but do not propose practical solutions on how to remove it. Other
work [1, 11] evidences that temporal consistency is crucial when
evaluating malware classifiers: the samples in the training set must
be temporally precedent to those in the testing set. In [12], we have
identified stricter temporal constraints and also that the testing
goodware-to-malware ratio must reflect the real world distribution,
or otherwise the results are misleading and possibly inflated.
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Figure 1: Tesseract workflow and the evaluation cycle.
The aim of the Tesseract tool is to aid researchers in executing
bias-free evaluations of ML classifiers for security.While we present
the theoretical implications of such bias and constraints and how
to remove it in a full-length work [12], this manuscript focuses on
the detailed description of the implementation of the open-source
tool that we have released to the community.
3 SYSTEM OVERVIEW
Tesseract is implemented as a Python library, designed to integrate
easily with common workflows. In particular, the API design of
Tesseract is heavily inspired by and fully compatible with the
popular machine learning libraries Scikit-learn and Keras. As a
result, many of conventions and concepts in Tesseract should be
familiar to users of those libraries.
The goal of Tesseract is to ensure a fair, time-aware evaluation
of security classifiers. To achieve this, Tesseractwill enforce proper
temporal and spatial constraints [12] to prevent results becoming
affected by experimental bias. As classifiers grow in complexity
by combining multiple machine learning techniques, it becomes
increasingly likely that these constraints will be violated. Tesseract
aims to reduce the burden on the algorithm designer by keeping
track of these properties at each stage of the experiment pipeline.
Tesseract divides the workflow into stages (Figure 1). Firstly,
the dataset is ordered chronologically and divided into a single
training set and multiple testing sets. Next, execution enters the
time-aware evaluation cycle where each iteration of the cycle pro-
cesses the subsequent set of test objects. The evaluation cycle is
composed ofmultiple stages centered around the standard “training”
and “prediction” procedures. The stage preceding training enables
adjustments to be made to the training set while the later stages
allow for policies for reacting to the results before the cycle repeats.
Finally, once all test objects have been processed, the complete
results are consolidated and presented to the user.
Tesseract is composed in a modular fashion, to reflect the
different stages of the evaluation cycle. Different phases of the
cycle are represented by subclasses of Stage, which can them-
selves be subclassed to implement specific learning strategies. In-
stances of these subclasses can then be injected into the function
fit_predict_update() which will activate them appropriately
throughout the evaluation or deactivate them according to a given
schedule (a boolean array) attached to the superclass. Alternatively,
any component from the framework can be appropriately selected
and used in conjunction with other libraries or methodologies.
The following paragraphs highlight details of the implementa-
tion and further explore the core stages of Tesseract’s workflow.
Temporal Awareness.While a single training or testing object
is typically represented as a set of featuresX and an output variable,
or ground-truth, y, Tesseract also expects a timestamp t . This al-
lows Tesseract to enforce temporal consistency when partitioning
the dataset; e.g., for training, validation or testing. Tesseract parti-
tions testing sets further into testing periods. Each period contains
test objects covering a particular timespan specified in days, weeks,
months, quarters or years. All test periods are processed in chrono-
logical order and all are temporally posterior to the training set.
Time-aware operations are implemented in temporal.py which
handles the various corner cases and complications that occur when
working with time deltas. A notable function from the module is
time_aware_train_test_split() that performs the dataset par-
titioning mentioned previously given a time period length, granu-
larity and an optional start date.
Pre-train Stages. Before training the classifier it can be benefi-
cial to make adjustments to the training set. For example, altering
the class balance of the training set can be used to tune a classifier
in order to make it more or less receptive to a particular class [12].
This is especially useful in many security applications where the
class of interest—often malicious—is also the minority class.
The module spatial.py contains downsample_set() to reduce
the majority class until the desired class balance is achieved, as
well as search_optimal_train_ratio() to estimate the optimal
training balance for a particular target metric (e.g., F1). Custom
methods for these adjustments can be injected by subclassing the
Rebalancer class and overriding its alter() method which will
then be invoked before training on each cycle iteration. The func-
tion downsample_set() can also be used to ensure the class balance
of each testing period is realistic, as over-representing the class of
interest at test time, with respect to what would be expected dur-
ing deployment, can erroneously inflate reported performance. For
this, spatial.py also includes assert_class_distribution() to
check that class balance reflects a given ratio within some variance.
Train and Predict Stages. During training, the classifier esti-
mates the relationship between the features and the output vari-
ables. By default, Tesseract invokes the fit function on the given
model, however, custom algorithms can be injected into the fitting
stage to aid interoperability or for experimentation.
In the next stage, the classifier attempts to predict correct classes
for the test objects in the current period. Tesseract will search for
typical classification functions—prioritizing those which output raw
scores (e.g., distance from hyperplane) and thus are more flexible
for calculating metrics. However, custom decision functions can
also be passed to the framework to override the default behavior.
Post-classification Stages. In classification with reject option, a
classifier can choose not to classify a particular observation due to
low confidence (e.g., class probability below a certain threshold);
rejected objects are quarantined for manual inspection, and their
predictions are not included in the performance results. However,
Tesseract reports a quarantine cost associated with rejection, as
manual inspection is time consuming. Rising quarantine costs signal
the onset of concept drift and the aging of the classifier’s model [8].
Policies for rejection, while optional, can be implemented by sub-
classing the Rejector stage class and overriding the reject()
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Figure 2: Plot generated byTesseract showing a comparison
of SVM and 3NN algorithms on Drebin feature space.
method. All Rejector subclasses will automatically keep track of
which predictions were discarded, which are used to quantify the
total quarantine cost.
Following the rejection stage, there is an opportunity to react
to the predictions of the classifier before the rebalancing and re-
training of the next evaluation cycle. For example, an active learn-
ing approach [14] can utilize a query strategy to select testing
objects to be manually relabeled, which are then integrated into
the training set before the next cycle. A popular query strategy is
uncertainty sampling, which selects objects that the classifier was
least certain about (e.g., those closest to the hyperplane in a binary
SVM), because they are most likely to make the decision boundaries
more precise once relabelled. Similarly to rejection, deriving ground
truths for test objects is associated with a relabeling cost. Active
learning techniques can be implemented in Tesseract by subclass-
ing the Selector stage and overriding the query() method. Sim-
ilarly to Rejector objects, all Selector stages will keep track of
costs they incur. Tesseract includes some useful implementations
for this stage, for example UncertaintySamplingSelector and
FullRetrainingSelector. This design should encourage further
experimentation with novel rejection and query strategies.
Metrics and Output. Tesseract maintains a set of metrics cal-
culated during each iteration of the evaluation cycle. These range
from the total positive and negative objects to metrics such as
Precision, Recall, and AUROC. As Tesseract aims to encourage
comparable and reproducible evaluations, we include functions for
visualizing classifier assessments and for measuring the classifier
robustness over a given time period with respect to each metric.
4 EXAMPLE
We present a case-study of Tesseract on Android malware analy-
sis. We consider applications from AndroZoo [2], an open dataset
which collects 6+ million apps with VirusTotal reports. We con-
sider a test-case with 50K apps from Jan 2015 to Dec 2016, with
10% malware and 90% goodware—which is the expected ratio of
malware-to-goodware in the wild [12]. We extract static features
according to the Drebin [3] algorithm, which relies on a linear
SVM; we perform grid-search to identify the best SVM hyperpa-
rameter, C=1. Figure 2 reports the output time-aware plots obtained
by training on 2015 (25K apps) and testing on 2016 (25K apps),
and compares the performance of SVM and kNN (k=3). The X -
axis reports the time periods, and the Y -axis different performance
metrics: F1-Score, Precision, Recall for both malware (strong col-
ors) and goodware (light colors). Figure 2 shows that SVM offers
a better Precision-Recall trade-off than 3NN, whereas 3NN has
similar F1 over time with respect to SVM, but a higher Precision
and a lower Recall. In both scenarios, the k-fold CV F1 (dashed
line) overestimates the classifiers’ performance. We also observe
that performance in detecting goodware does not drift much, and
remains consistently high in both algorithms.
5 CONCLUSIONS
We have presented in detail the system design and implementation
of the Tesseract [12] prototype, which can easily be used to re-
move temporal and spatial experimental bias when using machine
learning in security contexts. Tesseract supports any Scikit-learn
or Keras classifier and feature space, and is designed to be modular
and generic.
AVAILABILITY
We make Tesseract’s code and data available to the research com-
munity and practitioners. Please contact Lorenzo Cavallaro <lorenzo.
cavallaro@kcl.ac.uk> for access information.
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